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Abstract
Previous research has shown that survival-related processing of word lists enhances retention for
that material.   However, the claim that survival-related memories are more accurate has only been
examined when true recall and recognition of neutral material has been measured.  In the current
experiments, we examined the adaptive memory superiority effect for different types of
processing and material, measuring accuracy more directly by comparing true and false
recollection rates.  Survival-related information and processing was examined using word lists
containing backward associates of neutral, negative, and survival-related critical lures and type of
processing (pleasantness, moving, survival) was varied using an incidental memory paradigm.
Across four experiments, results showed that survival-related words were more susceptible than
negative and neutral words to the false memory illusion and that processing information in terms
of its relevance to survival independently increased this susceptibility to the false memory
illusion.  Overall, although survival-related processing and survival-related information resulted in
poorer, not more accurate, memory, such inaccuracies may have adaptive significance.  These
findings are discussed in the context of false memory research and recent theories concerning the
importance of survival processing and the nature of adaptive memory.
Keywords:  False memory, Associative memory, Encoding processes, Adaptive memory, Survival
memory
On the Susceptibility of Adaptive Memory to False Memory Illusions
            Recently, a number of researchers have shown that words specifically processed for their
importance to survival are remembered better than words processed in other contexts (e.g., Kang,
McDermott, & Cohen, 2008; Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007; Nairne, Pandeirada, &
Thompson, 2008; Weinstein, Bugg, & Roediger, 2008).  That is, memory for lists of words (e.g.,
items from categories such as fruit, vegetable, four-footed animals) is better when participants are
asked to rate them for their importance to survival (e.g., usefulness on a desert island) than when
they engage in other forms of semantic processing (e.g., pleasantness or self-reference ratings)
and this effect is thought to be independent of depth-of-processing (Nairne et al., 2008).  This
memory benefit is said to arise because human memory systems are primed to remember survival-
related information better than other types of information due to its greater adaptive value (Nairne
et al., 2007, 2008).
            Previous studies of this adaptive memory effect by Nairne and his colleagues (Nairne et
al., 2007, 2008; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008), as well as by others (e.g., Kang et al., 2008;
Weinstein et al., 2008), have focused almost exclusively on the amount of information that is
correctly remembered.  It is well known that because memory is reconstructive, errors can also
occur when people try to recollect things that were processed.  That is, people can forget
information that they have experienced (errors of omission) and “remember” information that they
have not experienced (errors of commission).  These latter errors, or false memories, have yet to
be examined in the context of adaptive memory.
It turns out that this is an important issue because if it is true that human memory benefits
from survival processing (i.e., adaptive memory is more accurate), this benefit must include both
better true recollection of information actually present in the environment (i.e., fewer errors of
omission), but also a reduced susceptibility to false memory illusions (i.e., reduced errors of
commission).  For example, if survival information is more distinctive and is processed at an item-
specific contextual level, then false memory rates should be low.  However, if survival-related
processing of information primes networks of strongly interrelated concepts, then once activation
spreads to these highly interconnected concepts, they should become active and serve as the basis
of false memory illusions (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Karpicke, McCabe, & Roediger, 2008;
Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001).  Therefore, if survival processing of information promotes
more relational than item-specific processing, then false memory rates should be higher for items
processed for their survival value than those same items processed for non-survival purposes.
Because recall and recognition rates tend to be higher for information processed for their
survival value than processed for, say, pleasantness, it would seem that there is clear evidence that
such survival processing reduces errors of omission (Kang et al., 2008; Nairne et al., 2007, 2008;
Weinstein et al., 2008).  However, there are some findings that suggest that errors of commission
may be higher in survival than other processing conditions.  For example, Nairne et al. (2007,
Experiment 1) found significantly higher rates of semantic intrusions when randomized lists of
neutral words were processed for their survival relevance than when processed for their
pleasantness.  Indeed, when the same, categorically related materials were processed for survival
instead of for pleasantness, higher intrusion rates were observed for survival than pleasantness
processing (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008, Experiment 1).  Although the mnemonic advantage for
survival processing remained even after participants who made intrusions were removed from the
analyses, both of these preliminary results are consistent with the idea that survival processing
promotes relational, not item-specific processing.  This processing, in turn, primes networks of
strongly interrelated concepts that are later falsely recollected.
Although categorized materials do give rise to errors of commission, there is considerable
evidence that networks whose relations are associative give rise to higher intrusion rates (e.g.,
Howe, Wimmer, & Blease, 2009b; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009c; Park, Shobe, &
Kihlstrom, 2005).  This may be because members of categorical lists are linked in a superordinate
(i.e., vertical) manner whereas members of lists of associates are linked within the same, basic
level (i.e., horizontally) (see Howe et al., 2009c; Park et al., 2005).  Regardless, it is clear that
items related to survival do not simply exhibit insular categorical relations (e.g., food, weapons)
but relations that cross category boundaries, linking one to the other in thematically mediated
associative networks (e.g., watering hole [a place to satisfy thirst or a place for cooling] (
vegetation [a place to hide or a source of food] ( other animals [a source of food or something to
be feared such as a predator] ( a sharp rock [to use as a tool to create something else or to be used
as a weapon).   Such associative networks (see Figure 1) are common in modeling human thought
(e.g., Anderson, 1976, 1983; Reder, Park, & Kieffaber, 2009) and involve a variety of semantic
relationships (e.g., temporal continguity, spatial proximity, feature overlap, shared perceptual
properties, category membership, antonymity, synonymy) (e.g., Wu & Barsalou, 2009).  Although
it is often difficult to discriminate associative strength and semantic overlap (see Hutchison,
2003), the use of associatively related lists (e.g., as in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott [DRM]
paradigm; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) has become the sine qua non for
researchers interested in the study of memory accuracy (i.e., the relationship between rates of
correct recollection and error rates).  Indeed, the use of the DRM paradigm to study memory
accuracy is appropriate because these lists contain many of the semantic relations found in human
thought, not just taxonomic (categorical) relations (see Brainerd, Yang, Reyna, Howe, & Mills,
2008b; Howe et al., 2009b, 2009c; Park et al., 2005).
We hypothesize that it is not only the processing of information for survival purposes that
results in differences in accuracy, but also the presentation of survival related materials
themselves.  That is, survival-related concepts (e.g., injury, death, struggled, virus, battle) should
be remembered differently than concepts that are not directly related to survival, regardless of
whether they are explicitly processed for their survival value.  Specifically, if adaptive memory
prioritizes survival information, then whether this survival priority is invoked by the type of
processing or type of material being processed may not matter.
To answer these questions about the type of processing at encoding as well as the type of
material being processed, we present a series of four experiments in this article.  In the first
experiment, we examined both type of processing (pleasantness vs. survival) and type of material
(neutral, negative, and survival related concepts) in a fully crossed design.  We did this in order to
examine the independent, as well as the combined, effects of processing and material on
recollection accuracy.
In the subsequent three experiments we focused on the effect of type of material on
memory performance.  To do this, we examined the hypothesis that increased true and false
recognition on survival relevant lists was due to the number and ease with which participants
could generate integrating themes.  Because fewer themes should be related to higher levels of
false recollection (i.e., as each list item is more likely to activate a single integrating theme)1, in
Experiments 2a and 2b we manipulated the number of themes available across list type.  In
Experiment 2a we equated neutral, negative, and survival lists on number of themes and showed
that true and false memory differences vanished for material but remained for type of processing
(pleasantness, moving, and survival).  In Experiment 2b, we maximized variation in the number of
themes across list materials and showed that higher true and false memory rates were associated
with lists that had fewer themes.
Finally, because levels-of-processing tasks such as those used in the adaptive memory
literature and in Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b here only provide a test of incidental memory, we were
interested in determining whether similar materials effects existed in the absence of an encoding
task and when intentional, not incidental, memory tests were employed.  Therefore, in Experiment
3 we examined materials effects in a standard DRM paradigm without an encoding manipulation
and using intentional memory instructions.  Together, these experiments show that both survival
processing and survival-relevant materials give rise to higher rates of true and false recollection
and, therefore, result in lower rates of net accuracy for survival processing and survival-related
concepts.  Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, we argue that such findings are consistent with
current models of false memory and represent a phenomenon that is really very adaptive.
Experiment 1
In order to examine the accuracy (both true and false recollection) of adaptive memories,
whether survival is induced via processing instructions, the materials themselves, or both
processing and materials, we modified Nairne et al.’s (2007, 2008) procedure using DRM-like
materials rather than categorized lists (e.g., Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008).  In addition, because
survival-related words are likely to be more emotionally charged than neutral words, we added
some non-survival-related words that are also emotionally (negatively) charged (see Howe, 2007).
 We did this in order to eliminate the possibility that any effect for survival-related materials
would simply be attributed to valence or arousal.  Thus, in the first experiment, we conducted an
incidental memory task like that used by Nairne and Pandeirada (2008), manipulating not only the
type of information processing (pleasantness or survival ratings of items) but also the type of
information being processed (neutral, negative, or survival-related) and measured recognition
accuracy.
Method
Participants
            Thirty-four participants took part in the experiment (11 male, 23 female).
Materials, Design, and Procedure
The experiment was a 3(list: neutral, negative, survival) x 2(processing task: pleasantness,
survival) mixed design where list type was manipulated within-participant and rating task was
manipulated between-participants.  Fifteen lists of 12 items each were selected from the word
association norms of Nelson et al. (1998):  five lists consisting of the high associates of neutral
critical lures (mountain, school, fruit, bread, and money), five lists consisting of the high
associates of negative critical lures (sad, bad, fat, cry, and anger), and five lists consisting of the
high associates of critical lures that were related to survival2 (death, hurt, sick, war, and fight) (see
Appendix A for the full lists and critical lures for Experiment 1).  The 10 words with the greatest
backward associative strength to the critical lures were presented at study (the 11th and 12th words
from each list were used as unpresented associates on the recognition test).  The items in all three
list-types were equated on level of backward associative strength, semantic density, word
frequency, word length, familiarity, meaningfulness, number of attributes, and imageability.  The
negative and survival lists were also equated for arousal (see Table 1 for means and contrasts).
Although it is important to equate items that are actually presented on other memory variables that
might be confounded with factors of interest, it is possible that similar inequities across critical
lures could also contaminate the results.  In order to control for this possibility, the critical lures
were also equated by list type for frequency, F(2, 17) = .57, p = .58, and familiarity, F(2, 17) =
3.49, p = .09, using norms from the e-lexicon project (Balota, Yap, Cortese, Hutchison, et al.,
2007).
            The rating task consisted of all 150 items (the top 10 from each of the 15 DRM-like lists)
compiled into a single list and presented in random order.  The primarily reason the list items
were presented in a mixed list format (all lists combined) was to faithfully replicate Nairne et al.’s
(2007) original paradigm in which he presented categorized neutral lists (e.g., hammer, nail, rope,
chair, table, stool) in a mixed list random order design.  In addition, because the lists in this
experiment consisted of the highest associates to the critical lures, presenting them in blocked
format would make the critical theme too salient and may have led participants to focus on the
theme of the lists rather than on the ongoing (processing) task.  Importantly, previous research
(e.g., Hicks & Starns, 2006) has found that a mixed list format still produces significant rates of
false remembering, albeit they tend to be lower than pure list formats traditionally used in the
DRM paradigm.  Consequently, because we used a mixed list procedure, any false remembering
effects may provide more conservative estimates of false memory rates than those obtained using
more traditional, pure list DRM procedures.
Participants were instructed that they would be rating words for a particular quality.  Upon
arrival, half of the participants were randomly assigned to either the pleasantness rating condition
and the other half to the survival rating condition.  Participants in the survival condition were
given the following instructions: “We would like you to imagine that you have been stranded in
the grasslands of a foreign land.  You are completely alone and have no supplies or basic survival
materials, so over the next couple of weeks you will need to find steady supplies of food and
water and protect yourself from predators.  We are going to show you a list of words and we
would like you to rate them for how relevant each word would be for your survival in this
scenario.”  The survival scale ranged from 1 (least relevant) to 7 (most relevant).  Participants in
the pleasantness condition were given the following instructions:  “We are going to show you a
list of words and we would like you to rate each word for how pleasant you find that word.”  The
pleasantness scale ranged from 1 (least pleasant) to 7 (most pleasant).  Regardless of rating task,
the 7-point rating scale appeared to the right of each word.
After completing the rating task, all participants were given one minute to complete as
many simple mathematical equations (numerical problems) as they could.  After the one-minute
distractor task was finished, participants received a recognition test consisting of 240 items
(arranged randomly) and asked to indicate whether an item had appeared on the list (marking
“yes”) or had not (marking “no”).  The list was comprised of:  the 15 critical lures, 8 words of
varying associative strength that were studied from each list (120 items), the unpresented 11th- and
12th-associates from each list (30 items), and 75 unrelated distracter items (30 neutral, 15
negative, 15 positive, and 15 survival-related).
Results and Discussion
We begin by analyzing differences in true and false recognition as a function of processing
task and list type.  We follow this by examining false positives for other semantically related
intrusions by analyzing acceptance rates for related distractors (neutral, negative, and survival
related) on recognition tests as a function of processing task.  Finally, we examine an overall
accuracy statistic [accuracy = true recognition/(true recognition + false recognition of critical
lures)], one that has been used in the DRM literature to evaluate overall trends in net recollection
performance (see Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008a).
True and False Recognition
            The proportion of words correctly recognized was calculated and analyzed using a 3(list:
neutral, negative, survival) x 2(processing task: pleasantness, survival) mixed analysis of variance
(ANOVA).  Correct recognition rates for the pleasantness and survival rating tasks although high,
were below ceiling.  There was a main effect for processing task on correct recognition, F(1, 32) =
4.26, p < .05, (p2 = .117, where participants in the survival condition (M = .87) correctly
remembered more words than participants in the pleasantness condition (M = .79).  In addition,
there was a significant main effect of list on correct recognition, F(2, 64) = 17.31, p < .001, (p2 =
.34.  Post-hoc tests revealed that survival (M = .84) and neutral (M = .86) words produced higher
correct recognition than negative (M = .78) lists (highest p  < .01).  There was no significant
interaction.  Consistent with Nairne and his colleagues (e.g., Nairne et al., 2007, 2008), true
recognition rates were higher regardless of type of material when it was processed for its survival
value than when it was rated for pleasantness.
            As with the correct recognition data, the proportion of critical lures falsely recognized was
calculated and submitted to a 2(processing task) x 3(list) mixed ANOVA.  There was a significant
main effect of processing task on false recognition, F(1, 32) =  18.87, p < .001, (p2 = .37, such that
the participants in the survival condition (M = .52) had higher rates of false recognition than the
participants in the pleasantness condition (M = .26).  The main effect of list was not significant
but there was a Processing task x List interaction, F(2, 64) = 3.21, p < .05, (p2 = .091.  As can be
seen in Figure 2, and was confirmed by post-hoc tests (p < .05), although survival processing
always led to more false memories than pleasantness processing, and survival lists had the highest
false recognition rate regardless of processing task (pleasantness or survival), negative lists had
higher false recognition rates when participants rated those words for survival than for
pleasantness.  These findings are quite unique and demonstrate that survival processing not only
leads to better true recognition (hence fewer errors of omission), but also to higher rates of false
recognition (errors of commission) for items that provide a semantic link across concepts on a list
(whether those concepts are neutral, negative, or survival relevant).  The question remains, does
this greater susceptibility to errors of commission extend to other unpresented but semantically
related concepts?
Related Distractors3
            In this section, we answer the question of whether false recognition rates also differed for
related distractors and not just critical lures.  Because Nairne and colleagues (Nairne et al., 2007;
Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008) have found differences in the rates of related intrusions as a function
of processing task (specifically, pleasantness vs. survival), we examined these same differences in
this experiment.  We calculated the number of false positives for related distractors and analyzed
them using a 2(processing task: pleasantness vs. survival) x 3(list: neutral, negative, survival)
mixed ANOVA.  The results were as follows: a marginally significant effect for processing task,
F(1, 32) = 4.01, p = .051, (p2 = .114, where there were more related intrusions for survival
processing (M = .15) than pleasantness processing (M = .09), and a main effect for list, F(1, 32) =
16.24, p <  .001, (p2 = .337, where post-hoc tests (p < .001) showed more related intrusions for
survival lists (M = .19) than neutral (M = .07) and negative (M = .09) lists, and the latter two did
not differ.  There was no interaction.  Like Nairne et al.’s (2007; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008)
findings, processing information for survival value led to higher false positives for related items
than when that same information was rated for pleasantness.  Perhaps of greater interest is the
finding that survival-relevant concepts also exhibited this pattern – that is, there were more false
positives for survival concepts than neutral or negative ones.
Accuracy
Finally, in order to answer the question of whether adaptive memories were more accurate
than other memories, we computed composite accuracy scores using both true and false (critical
lure) recognition measures.  The results of the 2(processing task) x 3(list) mixed ANOVA were as
follows: a main effect for processing task, F(1, 32) = 11.96, p = .002, (p2 = .272, where accuracy
was lower for survival (M = .65) than for pleasantness (M = .78) processing, and a Processing task
x List interaction, F(2, 64) = 3.88, p = .026, (p2 = .11.  As can be seen in Figure 3, and was
confirmed by post-hoc tests (p < .05), this interaction shows that although survival processing
always leads to lower accuracy levels than pleasantness processing, survival lists were also lower
in accuracy when rated for pleasantness.  Overall, then, survival processing and survival-relevant
concepts exhibited low levels of net accuracy.
            Together, the results of Experiment 1 are generally consistent with the findings from
Nairne et al.’s (2007; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008) experiments using neutral, categorical
materials.  Specifically, survival processing resulted in higher rates of correct recognition than
pleasantness processing.  Moreover, there were higher rates of semantic intrusions for material
processed for survival than for pleasantness, although these effects were marginal.
Importantly, this experiment produced two hitherto unreported effects.  First, when
associative (or DRM) lists were used, ones that may better mimic semantic relations used in
human thought than simply using categorical relations, both survival processing and survival
materials made independent contributions to recognition performance using an incidental memory
paradigm.  That is, not only was there better true recognition for concepts processed for their
survival value as well as survival-relevant concepts themselves, but also there were higher rates of
false recognition.  Second, when viewed in terms of net accuracy, survival items and items
processed for their survival value had lower rates of accuracy than items processed for
pleasantness or items that were not survival-relevant.  Indeed, when participants rated negative
items for their survival value, false recognition increased and accuracy decreased to levels similar
to that observed for survival items.  However, processing information for its survival value and
the use of survival-relevant materials both increased true and false recognition and these increases
resulted in an overall decline in memory accuracy.  Before we discuss the ramifications of these
findings for theories of false memory and adaptive memory more generally, we present three
additional experiments that flesh out these newly discovered effects more completely.
Experiments 2a and 2b
Although the effect of processing task on true recollection and semantic intrusions has
been observed by Nairne and his colleagues earlier, the increases in false recollection of critical
lures observed here has not been previously reported.  This effect may be due to the change in
materials, namely the use of associatively related (DRM) lists rather than categorical lists.  As
noted earlier, categorical lists are less likely than associative lists to give rise to false memories
(for a review, see Gallo, 2006).  We were interested in the increase in false recollection across
processing task and materials because these increments were observed alongside increases in true
recollection, a phenomenon not always seen in the false memory literature.  Indeed, oftentimes
true and false recollection rates have opposite trajectories and some theories (e.g., fuzzy-trace
theory, FTT; for a review, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) are well suited to account for such
dissociations.
So why should survival relevant concepts exhibit higher true and false recognition than
other materials that were equated across a number of important memory dimensions (see Table
1)?  In particular, why should these lists exhibit higher false recognition rates when they were
equated with other neutral and negative lists on a key false memory variable, backward
associative strength (BAS), a variable hitherto thought to be directly linked to, and primarily
responsible for, changes in false memory rates (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2008b)?
We speculate that the answer to this lies in the availability of a unique integrating theme.
That is, associative lists whose potential themes are few will tend to give rise to false recollection
more easily than lists with more potential themes as each list member provides activation for a
smaller set of potential themes (see Figure 4 for an illustration).  Recall that because these lists are
associative and there are many potential integrating themes (e.g., relations can be varied and
include temporal continguity, spatial proximity, feature overlap, shared perceptual properties,
category membership, antonymity, synonymy; see Wu & Barsalou, 2009), lists with fewer themes
(e.g., DEATH, Figure 4) stand a greater chance of activating a single theme more quickly, one
whose overall activation may be greater than lists with more themes (e.g., BREAD, Figure 4; also
see Arndt & Reder, 2003; Reder et al., 2009) (also see Footnote 1).  Thus, it may be this greater
activation, not just BAS, that increases false memory rates.  Intuitively, it seemed that survival
lists have fewer potential themes than negative or neutral lists (see Appendix A).
In order to test this, we recruited a separate group of participants who were asked to
generate as many themes as possible for each of the lists used in Experiment 1.  The results
showed that survival-related lists produced reliably fewer themes than negative lists (t[10] = 2.38,
p = .04) and neutral lists (t[10] = 2.83, p = .02), where negative and neutral lists did not differ
(t[10] = .89, p = .40).  In order to test the role of theme availability on false memory rates, we
conducted two additional experiments, one in which number of themes was equated across list
type (Experiment 2a) and one in which theme numbers differed maximally across list type
(Experiment 2b).  Like Experiment 1, all other lists characteristics were held constant, including
BAS.  If theme availability (as indexed by number of themes) is critical to false memory
generation, in addition to BAS, then list differences in false recollection rates should be
eliminated in Experiment 2a and heightened in Experiment 2b.  Moreover, to the extent that true
and false memory rates are correlated, as they were in Experiment 1, differences in correct
recognition should vanish across types of material in Experiment 2a and be maximized in
Experiment 2b as a function of list type.
Finally, because the effects of list type on true and false recollection may interact with
processing task, we again used an incidental memory paradigm and had participants rate items for
their pleasantness or relevance to survival.  In order to increase the generalizability of the impact
of processing task on true and false recollection, we added a moving scenario.  This scenario has
been used previously and represents a processing task that does not differ from survival
processing in semantic intrusion rates (Nairne et al., 2007).
Experiment 2a: Equating Theme Availability
Participants
A new sample of 18 undergraduates (6 males, 12 females) took part in this experiment.
Materials, Design, and Procedure
The experiment was a 3(processing task: pleasantness, moving, survival) x 3(list: neutral,
negative, survival) design where as before, processing task was manipulated between-participants
and list was a within-participant factor.  From the theme norms collected earlier, we established
the number of alternative themes (besides the critical lure) for each list in Appendix A.  From
these theme norms we selected 6 lists (2 neutral, 2 negative, 2 survival; see Appendix B) that had
the same number of alternative themes (M = 9.5).  In addition to being equated for the number of
alternative themes, the three list-types were equated on level of BAS, semantic density, word
frequency, word length, and familiarity (see Table 2 for means and contrasts).  As in Experiment
1, the critical lures were also equated for frequency and familiarity (highest F = 1.30, p = .39).
The same grasslands and pleasantness scenarios that were used in Experiment 1 were used
here.  In addition, we used a moving scenario in which we told participants that, "We want you to
imagine you are in the process of moving house, but there is no one around to help you so you
must arrange the move by yourself.  While imagining this scenario, your job will be to rate the
following words on a scale from 1-7 for how relevant the meaning of that word would be for you
successfully moving house on your own."
The rating task consisted of 60 items (10 items from each of the 6 DRM-like lists)
compiled into a single list and presented in random order eight words to a page.  To the right of
each word was a standard 7-point scale on which participants could rate the item for its relevance
to a scenario or its pleasantness.  The relevance scales in all conditions ranged from 1 (extremely
irrelevant) to 7 (extremely relevant), while the pleasantness scale ranged from 1 (extremely
unpleasant) to 7 (extremely pleasant).  Upon arrival, participants were assigned to one of three
processing conditions (pleasantness, moving, grasslands).  Once participants finished the rating
task they were given five minutes to work on a standard word search (created online) where they
were looking for the names of 30 British cities.
After five minutes, all participants were given the same recognition test consisting of 114
items (arranged randomly) and asked to indicate whether an item had appeared on the list
(marking “yes”) or had not (marking “no”).  The list was comprised of:  the six critical lures, eight
studied items from each list (48 items), two unpresented but related items from each list (12
items), and 48 unrelated (12 neutral, 12 negative, 12 positive, and 12 survival related) items.
Results and Discussion
            As before, we present true and false recognition data first followed by semantic intrusions
and net accuracy.
True and False Recognition
            The proportion of words correctly recognized was calculated and analyzed using a 3(list:
neutral, negative, survival) x 3(processing task: pleasantness, moving, survival) mixed ANOVA.
Although there were more words correctly recognized in the survival processing condition (M =
.92) than the moving (M = .89) and pleasantness (M = .87) conditions, these differences were not
significant.  Consistent with our speculation concerning the importance of theme availability to
true recognition (when correlated with false recognition rates), the analyses also revealed no main
effect for list and no interaction involving processing task and list.
The proportion of critical lures falsely recognized was calculated and submitted to a
3(processing task) x 3(list) mixed ANOVA.  There was a significant main effect of processing
task on false recognition, F(2, 15) =  5.47, p = .016, (p2 = .422.  Post-hoc tests showed that
participants in the survival condition (M = .35) had higher rates (p < .001) of false recognition
than the participants in the moving (M = .25) and pleasantness conditions (M = .19), and the latter
two conditions did not differ.  As anticipated having equated the number of themes across list
type, there was no main effect of list and no interaction of material and processing task.  Thus,
consistent with our speculation, theme availability is critical to both true and false recognition
rates.
Related Distractors
            To examine whether theme availability has similar effects on semantic intrusions, we
calculated the number of false positives for related distractors and analyzed them using a
3(processing task) x 3(list) mixed ANOVA.  The results showed that there were no main effects
and no interaction.  Thus, like true and false recognition rates, the number of false positive for
semantically related information does not differ when theme availability is held constant.
Accuracy
Finally, we computed net accuracy scores using both true and false (critical lure)
recognition measures and found a main effect for processing task, F(2, 15) = 3.95, p < .05, (p2 =
.345, where post-hoc tests (p < .05) showed that accuracy was lower for survival (M = .74) than
for moving (M = .80) and pleasantness (M = .83) processing, and the latter two did not differ.  As
predicted, there was no effect for list and no List x Processing task interaction.  Overall, when the
number of themes was equated across list type, there was no effect of material on true or false
recollection or on accuracy rates as there were in Experiment 1.  However, as anticipated, the
effects of survival processing remained – that is, processing concepts for their survival value
increased rates of false recognition and lowered levels of net accuracy.
            Together, these findings show that when the number of themes was equated across list
type, differences in rates of true and false (critical lures or semantic intrusions) recollection
disappeared and there were no changes in net accuracy due to materials.  However, the differences
observed in Experiment 1 due to processing type remained.  That is, survival processing, but not
moving or pleasantness processing, resulted in higher false recognition rates and lower net
accuracy.  Before elaborating on these findings, we present Experiment 2b in which we maximize
the between-list differences in number of themes in order to see whether we can reinstate the
materials effect using the same three processing tasks, survival, moving, and pleasantness.
Experiment 2b: Maximizing Different Numbers of Themes
In this experiment, we again used the norms collected earlier.  This time, however, we
used them to construct lists that maximized differences between the number of themes associated
with different materials.  Ideally, one would manipulate number of themes and list type (neutral,
negative, survival) orthogonally.  However, because there exists a “natural” correlation between
number of themes and list type, such an experiment is not feasible.   Instead, we picked lists that
maximized these natural differences such that survival lists had significantly fewer themes than
negative lists, which in turn, had significantly fewer themes than neutral lists.
Participants
A new sample of 18 undergraduates (7 males, 11 females) took part in this experiment.
Materials, Design, and Procedure
The experiment used the same 3(processing task: pleasantness, moving, survival) x 3(list:
neutral, negative, survival) design as Experiment 2a.  Using the same theme norms described
earlier we selected 6 lists (2 neutral, 2 negative, 2 survival; see Appendix C) such that the neutral
list had the most alternative themes (M = 15), the negative lists had fewer alternative themes (M =
9.5), and the survival lists had the fewest number of alternative themes (M = 6.5).  Aside from the
number of alternative themes, the three list types were equated on level of backward associative
strength, semantic density, word frequency, word length, and familiarity (see Table 3 for means
and contrasts).  The critical lures were again equated for frequency and familiarity (largest F <
1.0).
The rating task consisted of 60 items (10 items from each of the 6 DRM-like lists)
compiled into a single list and presented in random order eight words to a page.   To the right of
each word was a standard 7-point scale on which participants could rate the item for its relevance
to a scenario or its pleasantness.  As before, the relevance scales ranged from 1 (extremely
irrelevant) to 7 (extremely relevant), while the pleasantness scale ranged from 1 (extremely
unpleasant) to 7 (extremely pleasant).  Upon arrival, participants were assigned to one of the three
conditions (pleasantness, moving, grasslands).  Once participants finished the rating task they
were given five minutes to work on a standard word search (created online) where they were
looking for the names of 30 British cities.
After five minutes, all participants were given the same recognition test consisting of 114
items (arranged randomly) and asked to indicate whether an item had appeared on the list
(marking “yes”) or had not (marking “no”).  The list was comprised of:  the 6 critical lures, 8
studied items from each list (48 items), two unpresented but related items from each list (12
items), and 48 unrelated (12 neutral, 12 negative, 12 positive, and 12 survival related) items.
Results and Discussion
True and False Recognition
The proportion of words correctly recognized was calculated and analyzed using a 3(list:
neutral, negative, survival) x 3(processing task: pleasantness, moving, survival) mixed ANOVA.
As in Experiment 2a, there were more words correctly recognized in the survival processing
condition (M = .90) than the moving (M = .83) and pleasantness (M = .85) conditions, although
these differences were not significant.  As predicted, there was a main effect for list, F(2, 30) =
7.71, p = .002, (p2 = .339.  Post-hoc tests (p = .001) revealed that survival lists (M = .90) evinced
higher correct recognition rates than negative (M = .84) and neutral (M = .86) lists, and the latter
two lists did not differ reliably.  There was no significant processing effect or materials by
processing interaction.
            When the proportion of critical lures falsely recognized was calculated and submitted to a
2(processing task) x 3(list) mixed ANOVA, there was a significant main effect of processing task,
F(2, 15) = 7.14, p = .007, (p2 = .488, where post-hoc tests (p < .05) showed that participants in the
survival condition (M = .35) had higher rates of false recognition than the participants in the
moving (M = .25) and pleasantness condition (M = .17), and the latter two conditions did not
differ reliably.  There was also a main effect for list, F(2, 30) = 12.71, p < .001, (p2 = .459, where
post-hoc tests (p < .001) showed that survival lists (M = .39) had more false memories than
negative (M = .18) and neutral lists (M = .19), and the latter two conditions did not differ.  There
was no interaction between materials and processing.
Related Distractors
            When we analyzed the number of false positives for related distractors using a
3(processing task) x 3(list) mixed ANOVA, the results revealed a marginally significant effect for
processing task, F(2, 15) = 3.67, p = .051, (p2 = .328.  Post-hoc tests showed that there were more
related intrusions for survival processing (M = .26) than for moving (M = .11) and pleasantness
processing (M = .11; ps < .05), and the latter two conditions did not differ.  There was also a main
effect for list, F(2, 30) = 3.94, p = .03, (p2 = .208, where post-hoc tests (p < .05) showed more
related intrusions for survival lists (M = .25) than neutral (M = .10) and negative (M = .14) lists,
and the latter two lists did not differ.
Accuracy
Finally, when net accuracy scores were analyzed, the results of the 3(processing task) x
3(list) mixed ANOVA were as follows: a main effect for processing task, F(2, 15) = 5.26, p < .02,
(p2 = .412, where post-hoc tests (p < .005) showed that accuracy was lower for survival (M = .73)
than for moving (M = .82) and pleasantness (M = .86) processing, and the latter two conditions did
not differ.  There was also a main effect for list, F(2, 30) = 6.48, p = .005, (p2 = .302, where post-
hoc tests (p < .05) showed that survival lists (M = .72) had lower accuracy rates than negative
(M = .84) and neutral lists (M = .83), and the latter two lists did not differ.  Overall, then, when
differences in the number of themes were maximized, survival processing and survival-relevant
concepts exhibited low levels of net accuracy.
            In contrast to Experiment 2a, Experiment 2b revealed that when differences in number of
available themes are maximized rather than minimized, true and false recognition rates increase as
number of themes decrease.  Although the link between true and false recognition rates and theme
availability is not a linear one, it is a (negative) monotonic one.  That is, as the number of
available themes decreased (i.e., from neutral to survival lists), the rate of true and false memory
production increased.  As well, declines in net accuracy were also monotonically (positively)
related to theme availability – that is, as the number of themes decreased, so too did net accuracy.
Discussion of Experiments 2a and 2b
 When theme availability was systematically varied, true and false memory rates and rates
of false positives to related distractors varied predictably in a monotonic fashion.  Specifically,
when the number of themes was kept constant across lists (Experiment 2a), we were able to
eliminate list-based differences in true recognition and in false memory rates for critical lures and
related distractors.  When the number of themes differed maximally across lists (Experiment 2b),
we increased across list differences in true recognition and false memory rates for critical lures
and related distractors.  Because other between-list differences were controlled, these changes in
true recollection and false alarm rates cannot be attributed to factors other than our manipulation
of theme availability.  In particular, because we controlled variables known to influence true
recollection (e.g., meaningfulness, frequency, familiarity; see Tables 2 and 3), the observed
change in true recognition is most likely the result of changes in theme availability.  Similarly,
because we controlled BAS across lists, the observed changes in false memory rates cannot be
attributed to differences in the strength of backward associations, the usual source of differences
when using the DRM paradigm (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2008b).  Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 4,
we, like Reder et al. (2009; Arndt & Reder, 2003), suggest that lists that activate fewer themes are
more likely to give rise to false memories than lists whose members activate more themes.  Before
we outline the theoretical advantages of this additional factor when considering false memory
production, we present a fourth experiment in which we use the more traditional, intentional
memory paradigm used to study false memories.
Experiment 3
What the first three experiments have shown is that true and false memories as well as
errors of commission for related distractors increase when participants engage in processing items
for their survival value and when the materials themselves are survival relevant.  Moreover, we
have demonstrated that when a host of between-list factors known to influence memory are
controlled across materials, true recollection and errors of commission involving related
information (critical lures and related distractors) increase as the number of list themes decrease.
These effects were clearly demonstrated across these three experiments in which we used a
modified version of Nairne et al.’s (2007, 2008; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008) procedure that
included (a) the use of associative (DRM) materials rather than categorized lists, (b) controlling
for a variety of between-list factors that could affect true and false memory performance, and (c)
controlling for both valence (negative) and arousal.  Together the results of these experiments
showed that adaptive (survival) memories are remembered less, not more, accurately than other
memories when (a) rates of true and false responding are considered jointly and (b) other variables
that are known to affect accuracy (e.g., arousal, semantic density, word frequency) are controlled.
In this last experiment, we address one additional question, namely, to what extent do
these findings generalize to other memory situations in which participants are instructed to
intentionally remember survival-relevant information and not simply required to process
information incidentally and then later try to remember that information on a “surprise”
recognition test.  Although we followed Nairne et al.’s (2007, 2008) original design as closely as
possible for the sake of comparability, the use of incidental memory instructions might have
minimized the use of intentional memorization strategies (including the availability of source
monitoring information during retrieval).  The consequence of that might have been an inflation of
false recollection rates, hence reduced accuracy, although we attempted to minimize the inflation
of false memories by implementing a mixed list design.  However, it is still possible that some
inflation may have occurred as there is some evidence that levels-of-processing instructions can
increase both false recall and recognition rates (e.g., Rhodes & Anastasi, 2000; Thapar &
McDermott, 2001; Toglia, Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999).  In order to extend the generalizability
of our findings, in this last experiment we removed these potential confounds by conducting an
intentional memory study in which participants were instructed to memorize neutral, negative, and
survival-relevant information in a more traditional pure-list DRM format.
Method
Participants 
Twenty-five undergraduates (10 male, 15 female) participated in this experiment.
Materials, Design, and Procedure
Twelve lists of 11 items each were selected from the same norms used in our previous
experiments (see Appendix D).  Four lists were constructed from neutral critical lures (fruit,
window, music, and bread), four from critical lures that were emotionally negative (sad, cry, lie,
and bad), and four from critical lures that were determined to be related to survival (fight, sick,
death, and pain).  Only the 10 words with the greatest BAS were presented at study (the 11th word
from each list was used as an unpresented associate in the recognition test).
Like our previous experiments, we attempted to control for any between-list factors that
would influence true and false recollection rates.  Specifically, critical lures for the negative (M =
5.65) and survival (M = 5.63) lists were equated for arousal (Bradley & Lang, 1999).  In order to
rule out BAS as a confounding variable across all list types, a one-way ANOVA between the list
items and their lures revealed no significant differences across the three list types (neutral,
negative, survival-related), F(2, 9) = 0.72.  In order to eliminate any other possible item selection
confounds we calculated, for each list type, the average semantic density using the Nelson et al.
(1998) norms, word length and frequency using the e-lexicon project from Balota et al. (2007),
and familiarity using the Clark and Paivio (2004) norms.  Separate one-way ANOVAs were
conducted for each word characteristic with the factor list type (neutral, negative, or survival-
related).  Semantic density (F (2, 9) = 1.65, p =  .25), word frequency (F(2, 9) = 1.38, p = .30),
word length (F(2, 9) = .89, p = .44), and familiarity (F(2, 9) = 1.33, p = .31) yielded no significant
differences.  Overall, then, all three list-types were equated on BAS, semantic density, word
frequency, word length, and familiarity.  The two emotionally charged list-types were also
equated on valence and arousal.  Additionally, as in the previous three experiments we equated the
critical lures on the dimensions of frequency and familiarity (largest F = 1.23, p = .29).
The lists were recorded as audio files and played for participants using the i-tunes software
and standard earphones.  The lists were presented one word at a time with two seconds between
each word.  All list items were read in order of associative strength, from the strongest to the
weakest.  List type (neutral, negative, survival-related) was manipulated within subject so that
each participant received 4 of each type of list.  Using the standard DRM procedure, list types
were presented in blocks by list type (4 survival lists, 4 neutral lists, then 4 negative lists) and the
order of blocks was counterbalanced across subjects.  Unlike the previous three experiments, we
used a blocked list presentation consistent with prior intentional memory DRM studies.  As a
corollary, this should lead participants to be more aware of the underlying themes behind each list
and we would expect a slight inflation in false memory production.  The important point is that
because we were interested in generalizing our findings to more typical DRM studies in the
literature, we constructed Experiment 3 to replicate prior research involving the standard DRM
paradigm.
Upon arrival, participants were instructed that they would hear 12 lists of words and that
their task was to listen and try to remember as many words as possible.  Each list took
approximately 30 seconds to present.  After each list was presented, participants were given a
short distractor task (circling random letter pairs in randomized alphabet strings) for 30 seconds.
Participants were then given a free-recall sheet with 15 blank lines and asked to write down as
many words as they could remember from the previous list.  Participants were given up to 2
minutes to complete this task.  This procedure was then repeated for all 12 lists.
Following recall, participants received a recognition test consisting of a sheet of paper
containing 96 items (arranged randomly) and asked to indicate whether an item had appeared on
the list (marking “yes”) or had not (marking “no”).  The list was comprised of:  the 12 critical
lures, 4 words of varying associative strength that were studied from each list (48 items), the
unpresented, related associate (11th item) from each list (12 items), and 24 unrelated (neutral and
negatively-valenced) items.  All participants were tested individually.
Results and Discussion
Because there were no effects due to gender or blocking, and there were no theoretical
predictions concerning these variables, they were removed from the analyses reported here.  We
begin by reporting the findings for recall followed by those for recognition.
Recall
The proportion of targets correctly recalled and critical lures falsely recalled were
calculated and analyzed in separate one-way (list: neutral, negative, survival) ANOVAs.  For true
recall, there was a significant main effect of list, F (2, 48) = 32.01, p < .001, (p2 = .547, where post-
hoc tests showed that items on neutral lists (M = .76) were recalled better than items on negative
lists (M = .62; p < .001) and items on survival lists (M = .67; p < .001).  Finally, items on survival
lists were recalled significantly better than items on negative lists (p = .016).  For false recall,
although negative (M = .20) and survival (M = .20) lists produced more false recollection than
neutral (M = .16) lists, these differences were not significant.
Recognition4
Like the analysis of the recall data, the proportion of items correctly and falsely recognized
was analyzed in separate one-way ANOVAs.  The results for correct recognition revealed a
significant main effect of list type, F (2, 48) = 5.23, p < .01, (p2 = .179.  Post-hoc tests showed that
fewer negative items (M = .81) were correctly recognized than neutral (M = .91; p < .001) and
survival items (M = .89; p = .05), the latter two did not differ (p = .14).
The results for false recognition revealed a significant main effect of list type, F (2, 48) =
6.05, p < .01, (p2 = .201.  Post-hoc tests revealed that more survival critical lures (M = .45) were
falsely recognized than negative critical lures (M = .29; p < .001) or neutral critical lures (M = .25;
p < .001).  False recognition rates were not significantly different between negative and neutral
critical lures (p > .40).
Related Distractors
Finally, when we analyzed the number of false positives for related distractors the
ANOVA revealed a main effect for list, F(2, 48) = 5.49, p = .007, (p2 = .186, where post-hoc tests
(p < .05) showed more related intrusions for survival lists (M = .25) than neutral (M = .10) and
negative (M = .14) lists, and the latter two did not differ.
Accuracy
When we examined accuracy the ANOVA revealed a main effect of list, F (2, 48) = 5.10,
p = .01, (p2 = .175, where post-hoc tests showed that accuracy rates for survival lists (M = .69)
were significantly lower than those for neutral (M = .79; p < .01) and negative (M = .78; p < .01)
lists, and the latter lists did not differ.  Of course, because near-ceiling effects were observed for
true recognition of survival items, caution needs to be exercised when interpreting these accuracy
findings.  However, because similar trends were observed for recognition accuracy in previous
experiments, it may be that ceiling effects are not of particular concern.
            Overall, then, the results of the recognition portion of this experiment are consistent with
the findings of our other three experiments using an incidental memory paradigm.  The true recall
rates were not as consistent with our predictions as we would have liked, but this may simply be
due to the fact that the tasks are reflecting different processes: recall tasks require more
reconstructive processing whereas recognition tasks may rely more on judgments of familiarity
(for a more detailed consideration of differences between recall and recognition, see Brainerd,
Reyna, & Howe, 2009).  Indeed, it is not unusual to find differences of this sort between recall
and recognition tasks for lists varying in valence (e.g., Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, Otgaar,
Malone, & Wimmer, in press).  That is, neutral lists have frequently been found to be better
recalled than negatively-valenced lists and this has been attributed to the relative ease with which
neutral as opposed to negative information can be reconstructed in memory, both for children and
adults (e.g., Howe et al., in press).
Again, survival lists produced more false recognition than neutral or negative lists
resulting in lower net accuracy.  That false recognition rates were highest for survival lists
suggests that survival-related information itself, independent of additional processing instructions,
may be processed differently in memory than other material regardless of whether that processing
is brought about by intentional or incidental memory instructions.  Apparently, both survival-
related processing and survival-related information leads to the activation of highly interconnected
networks, ones that enhance the probability of false recollection, reducing overall accuracy for
adaptive memory.  Hence, at least for recognition, regardless of whether one intentionally or
incidentally processes survival-related items, such information is remembered less, not more,
accurately than either neutral or negative material.
General Discussion
            We began this article by asking three questions about the adaptive memory effect
(i.e., better recollection when concepts are initially processed at encoding for their survival
relevance than for other, non-survival properties).  Specifically, we wanted to know
whether this effect extended beyond survival processing of neutral, categorically organized
information to information that is organized in associative networks.  Second, we were
interested in whether these effects extended beyond concepts that are essentially neutral in
valence and would include information that is negative in valence or that is related to
survival itself.  Finally, we wanted to know whether these effects extended beyond
incidental memory paradigms and were also present when researchers used an intentional
memory task.
Together, the four experiments in this article provide a consistent answer to these
questions.  First, survival processing resulted in higher rates of true recognition regardless
of the type of material being processed.  What was surprising was that when associatively
related information served as the materials to be processed, survival-related encoding also
increased false recognition rates for critical lures (list themes) and for semantically related
distractors.  This outcome (i.e., positively correlated increases in true and false recognition
rates) is anticipated in associative models of false recollection (e.g., Associative-activation
theory, or AAT, see Howe et al., 2009c; or Activation-monitoring theory, or AMT, see
Roediger et al., 2001).
Second, survival-related materials, like survival-related processing, resulted in
more true and false recollection than other neutral and negative materials.  This despite the
fact that material, regardless of type, was equated on extraneous variables known to
increase both true (e.g., familiarity, semantic density) and false (e.g., BAS) recollection.
Third, the results for survival related materials were just as robust when we used an
intentional memory paradigm as when we used an incidental memory task.  Thus, across
four experiments, three (Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b) using an incidental memory paradigm
and one (Experiment 3) using an intentional memory paradigm, survival processing and
survival relevant concepts resulted in more true and false recollection.  When taken
together and net accuracy was calculated, adaptive memory was less accurate, not more
accurate.
In order to explain these novel and robust materials effects, we hypothesized that lists with
fewer themes are more likely to activate that theme than lists that have multiple themes (see
Figure 4).  If true recognition is partially determined by list coherence (the extent to which items
are related, consistent with research on semantic density; see Talmi, Luk, McGarry, &
Moscovitch, 2007), and the coherence of a list is dependent on the ease with which participants
are able to identify an integrating theme, then lists with fewer themes should give rise to greater
correct recollection. This is exactly what we found even when we controlled for semantic density.
Similarly, if false memory production is not only contingent on the backward associative strength
of list items to the critical lure but also on how many competing themes are activated in memory,
then lists with fewer possible themes are more likely to produce a specific false memory than lists
with multiple themes.  This too is what we found even when we controlled for backward
associative strength.
            Spreading activation models that include “theme” nodes can account for false memory
production (Arndt & Reder, 2003).  In these models, networks contain specific theme nodes that
become activated when participants encounter several concepts that are related.  Like other nodes,
theme nodes are activated every time a related concept is encountered and if their activation levels
exceed a specific threshold, they can activate other, unpresented concepts that are theme-relevant.
If we assume that lists with fewer themes are more likely to activate the relevant theme node more
frequently, we should see higher activation levels, ones that are above threshold, earlier and more
frequently in these lists than in lists with greater numbers of themes.  Because such activation
increases not only true memories but also memory for unpresented but related information (false
memories), lists with fewer themes may exhibit higher rates of true and false recognition, and
hence lower overall rates of accuracy (just as we saw in the four experiments here).
            These speculations lead to the question of whether our data inform current theories of false
memory?  Although these experiments were designed to examine adaptive memory effects and
not theories of false memory, the results may have important implications for our understanding
of the development of false memory illusions.  The finding that both true and false recognition
rates increased with survival information is consistent with models that rely on spreading
activation across related items in memory networks (e.g., AMT – Roediger et al., 2001; AAT –
Howe et al., 2009c).  In both of these models, often what increases true memories (spread of
activation throughout well-integrated networks) also increases false memories because this spread
extends to unpresented but related items.  When theme nodes are included in the network (e.g.,
Arndt & Reder, 2003), these models can also account for the material-based differences in false
memory effects observed in the current experiments, even when backward associative strength
(and other between-list memory factors) are well controlled.
            FTT (Brainerd et al., 2008a) predicts a dissociation between true and false recollection due
to the different roles verbatim and gist memory processes play in recognition.  True recognition is
often mediated by verbatim traces and false recollection occurs due to reconstructive processes
inherent in gist traces.  Because of the opposing roles played by gist and verbatim traces, materials
that affect one type of trace generally have the opposite effect on the other type of trace.  If the
material being processed biases participants toward a greater reliance on gist at recollection, then
FTT would predict more false, and less true, memory.  On the other hand, if the material being
processed biases participants toward greater reliance on verbatim traces, then FTT would predict
more true, and less false, memory.  This is an admittedly simplified version of FTT and a more
exhaustive exegesis of FTT’s detailed assumptions will most certainly provide an account of the
outcomes observed here, including the finding that manipulations designed to increase true
recollection also increased false recollection.
Regardless of which theory of false memory best accounts for the outcome of the current
experiments, the main question addressed in this article is how the outcome of these experiments
can be interpreted in the context of adaptive memory theory.  On the one hand, it would not seem
to be particularly adaptive for survival memories to be less accurate than other types of memories
or that they should be more prone to false recollections of experiences, especially if those
experiences are critical to survival.  However, what we argue is that retaining false recollections
of survival-related processing of information is a byproduct of something that can also be very
adaptive – that is, processing of information related to survival primes related information in
memory, information that may be subsequently used to guide attention to other survival-related
materials.  Specifically, activation spreads (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Karpicke et al., 2008;
Roediger et al., 2001) to other survival-relevant knowledge, knowledge that can be used to direct
attention to key aspects of the environment that may be essential to survival.  That memory can
prime attention making the individual hyper-vigilant to other survival-relevant stimuli in the
environment may be extremely adaptive and help the individual to detect things in the
environment that might save their life (for a similar perspective on the role of stress and the
development of hyper-vigilance in maltreated individual’s attention, see Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti,
2006).  Thus, it may not be that false memories per se are adaptive, but rather, the rapid and
automatic activation of related information in memory that primes attention to allow the
individual to scan the environment for other stimuli relevant to the survival-related situation.
Indeed, if one is faced with threat from a predator, it may be adaptive to prime attention to quickly
scan the environment for places to hide, weapons for defence, allies to assist, and so forth.  That
the byproduct of this may be a false recollection of the experience may be a small price to pay for
one’s survival.
Alternatively, false memories themselves may turn out to be useful in related problem-
solving tasks.  For example, we have recently demonstrated the utility of generating false
memories by examining their potential benefits (e.g., priming) on subsequent performance on a
different task (Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, 2009a).  We gave participants a series of
compound remote associate tasks (CRATs) where the goal was to come up a single word (e.g.,
tree) that serves to integrate the meaning of a triplet of presented words (e.g., apple, family,
house).  For half of the problems, participants first saw a DRM list whose critical lure was also the
solution to one of the problems.  For the other half of the problems, no such list was presented.
The results showed that for those problems where the critical lure had been falsely remembered,
CRAT solutions were not only more likely but participants arrived at these solutions more rapidly
than when attempting to solve them without prior exposure to a DRM list or to CRATs that had
been primed by a list but where no critical lure had been falsely remembered.
Indeed, false recollections of survival-related information itself may turn out to be quite
adaptive.  For example, it may be adaptive to misremember the presence of a predator at a specific
location (e.g., a watering hole) given the existence of only a few signs that the predator had visited
there at some earlier time (e.g., predator tracks, feces).5  The individual who is more likely to
survive a future trip to that location may be the one who behaves more warily having
misremembered the presence of the predator than the one who accurately remembered that only
the signs of the predator, not the predator itself, had been at that location.  In other words, the
tendency to misremember may not only serve to cue one about additional hazards currently in the
environment, but also about those that can threaten one’s survival in the future.  This idea is
consistent with other recent research showing that one of long-term memory’s most important
adaptive functions is to store information about the past in the service of planning for the future
(Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2010).
Regardless of which interpretation turns out to be correct, the current experiments provide
the first data to examine the accuracy (both true and false recollection) of survival-related
processing of neutral, negative, and survival-relevant concepts.  The findings clearly demonstrate
that when other, potential confounding factors are controlled (e.g., BAS, semantic density, word
frequency), information processing related to survival generates not only more true recognition
but also more errors of commission.  These errors involve not only false recognition of critical
lures that are thematically related to the presented information, but also other list members that
while not presented during encoding, gave rise to false positives during recognition tests.  The
same was found for survival-related concepts themselves with the net result being an overall
reduction in accuracy for what has been termed, adaptive memory.  Perhaps increases in true and
false recognition rates result from the fact that survival-related materials have fewer thematic
alternatives, leading to more efficient activation of related concepts in memory.  Such efficient
activation can also lead to increases in both true and false recollection rates.  Although it may
eventually be shown that adaptive memory effects are simply a special case of more general
memory principals as suggested here, the current findings add a critical caveat to any
interpretation – that is, adaptive memories exhibit higher rates of true and false recognition, rates
that conspire to reduce net accuracy when compared to memory for other types of information.
Importantly, as we have argued, this more efficient activation of related information in memory
networks may have a hitherto unrecognized adaptive significance.  Like the conclusions of other
experiments in this newly emerging area, the proximate mechanism driving these memories may
not be well delineated yet, but the results of the current experiments are undeniable and unique –
adaptive memories, although less accurate, are perhaps more useful when it comes to solving real
world, survival-related problems.
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Appendix A: Neutral, Negative, and Survival Lists used in Experiment 1
I. Neutral Lists
MONEY          MOUNTAIN              BREAD                       FRUIT                        SCHOOL
job                   climber                        baker                           berry                campus
bill                   hill                               bun                              cherry              university
income             climb                           butter                          citrus               semester
salary               peak                            crust                             kiwi                 education
debt                  hike                             dough                          pear                 principal
earn                  top                               garlic                          plum                educate
pay                   valley                          loaf                              produce           backpack
greed                cliff                             stale                             raspberry         book
tax                    hiker                           toast                             strawberry       college
cent                  summit                        wheat                          vegetables       learning
63
False Memory Illusions in Adaptive Memory
II.  Negative Lists
SAD                FAT                 CRY                ANGER                      BAD
blues                blubber            baby                rage                             attitude
depressed         thin                  emotion          hostility                       awful
despair             calories            handkerchief   fury                             good
frown               skinny             laugh               enrage                          mischief
grief                 slim                 onion               frustration                   nasty
happiness         weight             sensitive          temper                         sin
happy               diet                  sob                  revenge                        terrible
lonely              thigh                tears                 mad                             unpleasant
misery              slender                        upset                pissed                          villain
remorse            wide                weep               mean                            worse
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III.  Survival Lists
FIGHT                         DEATH          SICK               HURT                         WAR
arguing                        burial               disease                        harm                            revolution
battle                            casket              fever               pain                              veteran
conflict                        cemetery          flu                   injury                           peace
debate                          funeral             healthy                        ouch                            nuclear
disagreement               grave               hospital            offend                         missile
feud                             life                   medicine         sore                              soldier
fists                              murder                        nausea             wound                          tank
riot                               suicide             throw up         bruise                           cannon
struggled                      tragedy                        virus                pinch                           bomb
boxing                         widow             well                  punish                         destruction
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Appendix B: Neutral, Negative, and Survival Lists used in Experiment 2a
Neutral Lists                    Negative Lists                        Survival Lists
BREAD           SWEET           SAD                ANGER          HURT             WAR
honey               job                   blues               rage                 harm                revolution
bitter                bill                   depressed        hostility           pain                 veteran
sugar                income                        despair             fury                 injury              peace
sour                  salary              frown               enrage             ouch                nuclear
candy               debt                 grief                 frustration       offend             soldier
tart                   earn                 happiness         temper                        sore                  missile
tangy                pay                  happy              revenge           wound              tank
cute                  greed               lonely              mad                 bruise              cannon
dessert             tax                    misery             pissed              pinch               bomb
nice                  cent                 remorse           mean                punish             destruction
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Appendix C: Neutral, Negative, and Survival Lists used in Experiment 2b
Neutral Lists                     Negative Lists                        Survival Lists
MOUNTAIN   SCHOOL         SAD               ANGER          FIGHT                        DEATH
climber            campus             blues               rage                 arguing            burial
hill                   university         depressed       hostility           battle               casket
climb               semester           despair            fury                 conflict            cemetery
peak                 education         frown              enrage             debate              funeral
hike                  principal          grief                frustration       disagreement   grave
top                   educate            happiness        temper             feud                 life
valley               backpack         happy              revenge           fists                  murder
cliff                  book                lonely              mad                 riot                  suicide
hiker                college             misery             pissed              struggled         tragedy
summit            learning           remorse            mean               boxing             widow
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Appendix D: Neutral, Negative, and Survival Lists used in Experiment 3
I.  Neutral Lists
BREAD                       WINDOW                              MUSIC                                    FRUIT
baker                            blinds                                      band                                        berry
bun                              curtain                                     concert                                     cherry
butter                           door                                         harmony                                  citrus
crust                             drapes                                     jazz                                          kiwi
dough                          glass                                        orchestra                                  pear
garlic                           ledge                                        radio                                        plum
loaf                              pane                                         rhythm
produce
stale                             shatter                                      stereo                                      raspberry
toast                             shutter                                     symphony                               strawberry
wheat                           sill                                           tune                                         vegetables
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II.  Negative Lists
SAD                            LIE                                          CRY                                        BAD
blues                            bluff                                        baby                                         attitude
depressed                     deceive                                    emotion                                  awful
despair                         deception                                handkerchief                            good
frown                           deny                                        laugh                                       mischief
grief                             dishonest                                 onion                                       nasty
happiness                     perjury                                                sensitive                                  sin
happy                           rumor                                      sob                                          terrible
lonely                          truth                                         tears                                        unpleasant
misery                          untrue                                     upset                                        villain
remorse                        untruthful                                weep                                       worse
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III.  Survival Lists
FIGHT                         PAIN                                      SICK                                       DEATH
arguing                        ache                                         disease
burial
battle                            aspirin                                     fever                                        casket
conflict                        cramp                                      flu                                            cemetary
debate                          headache                                 healthy
funeral
disagreement               hurt                                          hospital                                   grave
feud                             injury                                       medicine                                 life
fists                              ouch                                        nausea                                     murder
riot                               sore                                         throw up                                  suicide
struggled                      torture                                     virus                                        tragedy
war                               ulcer                                        well                                         widow
62
False Memory Illusions in Adaptive Memory
Authors’ Note
Mark L. Howe and Mary H. Derbish, Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster,
United Kingdom LA1 4YF.  This research was supported by a grant to MLH from the Economic
and Social Research Council of Great Britain (RES-062-23-0452).  Correspondence concerning
this research should be addressed to Prof. Mark L. Howe, Department of Psychology, Lancaster
University, Lancaster, UK  LA1 4YF.
63
False Memory Illusions in Adaptive Memory
Footnotes
1The astute reader will notice that we argued earlier that categorical information is usually
linked to a single theme (i.e., the category label) whereas associative information can be
linked to multiple themes (see Figure 1).  If lists with fewer themes are more likely to give
rise to higher rates of false recollection, then why do category lists not produce more false
memories than associative lists?  The reason for this is simple and it has to do with the
hierarchical structure of categorical lists.  As Park et al. (2005) and others (e.g., Gallo,
2006) have demonstrated, items that are organized in a superordinate or vertical relation
tend not to be as susceptible to false memory illusions as those whose members occupy the
same horizontal strata (e.g., basic-level concepts).  So when we refer to number of themes
or theme availability, we restrict ourselves to items that occupy similar strata and do not
traverse different ordinate levels.
2Although survival items were selected based on intuition, it is important to validate these
common sense judgments with objective data.  To do so, we asked an independent group
of participants to rate items from the DRM lists for their importance to survival using the
same instructions as we gave participants in Experiment 1.  When these judgments were
combined with the judgments of those who participated in Experiment 1, our intuitions
were validated.  All participants rated the words on our survival lists as more survival
relevant (M = 4.41) than words on our neutral (M = 2.75) and negative lists (M = 3.68).  A
one-way ANOVA confirmed the reliability of these differences, F (2, 51) = 38.93, p <
.001, and post-hoc tests showed that all differences were statistically significant (largest
p < .001).  Thus, consistent with our intuition, items on our survival lists were more
survival relevant than items on the neutral and negative lists.
3We also analyzed patterns of false positives for unrelated distractors and intrusions and
found that across all four experiments, there were no significant effects due to processing
task or list.  Thus, neither survival processing nor survival lists increase false positives
across the board.  Instead, the increase in errors of commission is confined to items that
are semantically related to the processing task itself or the materials (i.e., critical lures and
related distractors).
4It is important to note that in Experiment 3, the recognition findings were unaffected by
the prior recall test.  That is, when recognition probabilities were conditionalized on
whether an item had been recalled earlier, the patterns of findings were no different than
when the unconditional recognition probabilities were analyzed (for similar findings, see
Marche, Brainerd, Lane, & Loehr, 2005).  In addition, using a separate but smaller sample
of participants, we examined recognition performance without an intervening recall test.
Analyses of these data showed the same pattern of results as the ones reported here that
were preceded by a recall test.
5We thank Jim Nairne for suggesting this adaptive function for false memories.
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Table 1
Contrasts of List Characteristics for Experiment 1.
                                       List Type
Characteristic              Source                        Netural    Negative    Survival        Contrast
Arousal                        ANEW Norms                          N/A          5.85           5.32      t(8) = 1.89
    (Bradley & Lang, 1999)                                                         p = .12
BAS                        Nelson et al., 1998              .29            .30             .30     F(2, 12) = .59
                                                                                                                           p = .95
Semantic                 Nelson et al., 1998              .08            .07             .10      F(2, 12) = .39
Density                                                                                                               p = .76
Frequency               Balota et al., 2007              9.07        9.57          8.82       F(2, 12) = .81
(LogFreq)                                                                                                          p = .46
Word Length          Balota et al., 2007               5.65        5.25           5.72      F(2, 12) = .32
(Num Letters)                                                                                                     p = .73
Familiarity             Clark & Paivio, 2004          5.98        5.96           5.97    F(2, 12) = .003
                               Togila & Battig (1978)                                                                   p = .99
Imageability          Clark & Paivio, 2004           5.25        4.71           4.95    F(2, 12) = 3.42
                               Togila & Battig (1978)                                                                   p = .07
Meaningfulness    Clark & Paivio, 2004            4.64        4.46           4.85    F(2, 12) = 1.17
                                                                                                                          p = .34
Number of             Clark & Paivio, 2004          4.03         3.58           4.28    F(2, 12) = 1.71
Attributes                                                                                                          p = .22
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2
Contrasts of List Characteristics in Experiment 2a.
Characteristic              Source                                     Contrast                                               
BAS                        Nelson et al., 1998               F(2, 5) = 0.22,  p = .81
Semantic                 Nelson et al., 1998               F(2, 9) = .48,  p = .63
Density
Frequency               Balota et al., 2007               F(2, 5) = .33,  p = .74
(LogFreq)
Word Length          Balota et al., 2007                F(2, 5) = 1.54,  p = .35
(Num Letters)
Familiarity             Clark & Paivio, 2004           F(2, 5) = .82,  p = .52
                               Togila & Battig (1978)
Imagability            Clark & Paivio, 2004            F(2, 5) = 2.63,  p = .22
                               Togila & Battig (1978)
Number of             Clark & Paivio, 2004           F(2, 5) = 1.13,  p = .43
Attributes
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3
Contrasts of List Characteristics in Experiment 2b.
Characteristic              Source                                     Contrast                                               
BAS                        Nelson et al., 1998               F(2, 5) = 0.98,  p = .47
Semantic                 Nelson et al., 1998               F(2, 9) = .48,  p = .63
Density
Frequency               Balota et al., 2007               F(2, 5) = 1.46,  p = .36
(LogFreq)
Word Length          Balota et al., 2007                F(2, 5) = 2.00,  p = .28
(Num Letters)
Familiarity             Clark & Paivio, 2004           F(2, 5) = .21,  p = .82
                               Togila & Battig (1978)
Imagability            Clark & Paivio, 2004            F(2, 5) = 4.12,  p = .14
                               Togila & Battig (1978)
Number of             Clark & Paivio, 2004           F(2, 5) = 3.67,  p = .16
Attributes
________________________________________________________________________
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Figure Captions
Figure 1.  Hypothetical network representations for category and associative (DRM) lists
for the
same theme (i.e., DRINK).  Whereas category items link to a single superordinate
relation,
associative lists can be mediated by multiple relations.
Figure 2.  Proportion of critical lures falsely recognized (with standard error bars) as a
function of
processing task and list type for Experiment 1.
Figure 3.  Recognition accuracy (with standard error bars) as a function of processing task
and list type for Experiment 1.
Figure 4.  Hypothetical network representation for survival (e.g., DEATH) and neutral (e.g.,
BREAD) lists that vary in number of themes.
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Figure 4.
